Resource Misallocation and Political Cycles
利用1998-2007年中国制造业企业数据，发现地方党代会期间资源错配显著加剧，且这一效应在国企集中、资本密集或关联效应强的行业更明显，表明官员晋升激励虽促进GDP增长，但损害了资源配置效率。
Using a large dataset of manufacturing firms and local officials during 1998-2007,this paper investigates the empirical relationship between resource misallocation in the manufacturing sector and the timing of local Party Congress in China.Exploiting the measure of industrial-level resource misallocation proposed by Hsieh and Klenow(2009),we find that the manufacturing misallocation significantly increases in the Party Congress year and the subsequent two years,and decreases in the other two years.This relationship between misallocation and political cycles becomes more pronounced for industries with higher concentration of stateowned enterprises,capital-intensive firms or industries with strong linkage effects.This evidence suggests that while the promotion incentive of local officials in China may induce high GDP growth,it also generates negative impacts on allocative efficiency.