Government Intervention,GDP Growth and Local SOE Overinvestment
研究了2000-2006年中国上市公司，发现政府为促进GDP增长而干预地方国企投资，导致过度投资，且市场化慢或GDP增长差时问题更严重。
This paper investigates the motivation of government to intervene in local SOE investment and its consequences. Using the sample of listed companies from 2000 to 2006,we find that government interventions bring about local SOE overinvestment for the purpose of CDP growth.In the regions with slow marketization pace,or when the performance of CDP growth is relatively poor,the government interventions become stronger, and the problems of local SOE overinvestment are likely to be more severe.What's more,government interventions do not change with the variety of SOE shareholding style.The SOEs indirectly controlled by government have the same level of overinvestment as those SOEs controlled directly by government The results also provide supports for the reform of Chinese officer performance appraisement mode.