A Theoretical Study on Debts of Local Governmental Financing Platforms
基于有限承诺下的动态债务模型，研究地方政府融资平台债务对私人生产与资源配置的负面影响，并解释中国平台债务高企的官员激励原因。
Based on a dynamic debt model under limited commitment,this paper studies the role of public investment in private production and negative impacts upon resource allocation from Local Governmental Financing Platforms(LGFPs) debts,leading to a theory of proper quantity of LGFPs debts in China's context.Strong incentives of LGFPs to issue debts,reflected by massive scale of LGFPs'debt in China,can be explained by performance incentives of local government officials.In the long term,local govenunent ought to reduce reliance upon LGFPs debts and to promote substantial roles of private investment and market in allocating resources.