Ownership Type,Information Quality,and Corporate Bond Pricing;the Empirical Evidence from Capital Market in China
利用沪深两市上市公司公开发行的公司债券数据，研究了所有权类型和信息质量对中国公司债券初始定价的影响，发现国有所有权通过隐性担保降低信用利差，而自愿披露内控鉴证报告能提高信息质量并降低信息风险，但这一效应在国有上市公司中不显著。
Utilizing data of corporate bonds issued publicly by the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges,this paper studies the effect of ownership type and information quality on initial pricing of corporate bonds in China.It is found that state - owned ownership burdens implicit guarantee,which could lower the credit spread of corporate bonds significantly by direct and indirect paths to default risk.While listed companies voluntarily disclose the positive internal control assurance reports can play a signal function to the public about higher information quality.Investors will give a higher price of corporate bonds issued by these listed companies,because of the lower information risk,but this is not significant in the sample of state - owned listed companies,which maybe mean that governments' implicit guarantee make investors ignore the necessary attention to information quality of listed companies,inducing moral hazard.These findings are useful for deepening the analysis on profound issues in corporate bond market pricing,and will promote its reform and development.