Issuance Examination Committee Connections,Hidden Rules and Resource Allocation Efficiency of IPO Market
利用中国资本市场证券发行审核改革的独特制度背景，手工收集发审委关联数据，实证检验发审委关联是否显著提高企业IPO过会概率，以及是否导致上市前后业绩显著下滑。
Using the unique institutional setting of security issuance examination reform in the Chinese capital market and derivative hidden rules,this paper manually collects the data of Issuance Examination Committee Connections(IECC) and empirically investigates two key problems related to resource allocation efficiency of IPO markets:(1) whether IECC significantly increase the probability of firms' passing IPO application;and (2) whether IECC cause a significantly worse performance change from pre - IPO to post - IPO.The results show that IECC do significantly increase the probability of firms' successful application,and there is a significandy positive relation between the strength of IECC and the probability of firms' successful application.The results of sub - groups suggest that IECC significantly increase the probability of successful application if the ultimate owners of firms are-non - state - owned enterprises,or if firms do not locate in government policies - supported industries.Both accountant connections and lawyer connections significantly increase the probability of firms' successful application.Furthermore,this paper also finds that there is a significantly negative relation between performance change from pre - IPO to post - IPO and IECC and the strength of IECC.These results, taken together,can lend empirical evidence and supports to China Securities Regulatory Commission for its further reformation of IPO issuance examination rules.