On the Asymmetric Information on China's Credit Market
介绍了信贷市场中逆向选择和道德风险两种信息不对称模型，并利用中国国有商业银行数据验证了道德风险模型更符合实际，即抵押贷款违约率更高且利率更高。
In the paper,the authors firstly introduce two models about asymmetric information in credit markets:adverse selectionmodel andmoral hazardmodel.Adverse selection model assumes that banks do not know the types of borrowers,and collateral could be used as a signal to signal its high quality type,so high quality borrowers provide collateral to get loans with low interest rates and low quality borrowers get loans without collateral and pay high interest rates.Ex post,the loans with collateral will default less than that without Moral hazard model assumes that banks know about the risk type of borrowers,but cannot monitor borrowers' behavior,and that the high quality borrowers have less incentive to abuse the loans.To reduce the low quality borrowers' incentive to abuse the loans,banks ask low quality borrowers to provide collateral and pay high interest rate.Hence,the loans with collateral will default more than that without.Secondly,based on the data of China state-owned commercial banks,the empirical evidence of the paper shows that moral hazard model's prediction is more consistent with real credit market equilibrium,and that loans with collateral pay high interest rate than that without and loans with collateral default more than that without.This means that the problem ofEx post asymmetric informationis more serious than that ofEx ante asymmetric informationon credit markets.