Family Control,Double Principal-agent Conflicts and Cash Dividend Policy
基于2004-2008年中国A股上市公司数据，检验了家族控制和双重代理冲突对现金股利政策的影响，发现家族企业现金股利支付倾向和比率比非家族企业低35%，且双重代理冲突有显著负向影响。
Using a sample of 1378 A-share listed companies for the period 2004～2008,this paper empirically tests the impacts of family control and double principal-agent conflicts on the cash dividend policy of listed companies in China.The results show that,(1) the cash dividend payout propensity and ratio of family listed companies are 35%lower than that of non-family listed companies;(2) double principal-agent conflicts of listed companies have significant negative impacts on the cash dividend payout propensity and ratio;(3) controlling family shareholders intensify the Agency Problem I(the owner-manager conflict) rather than the Agency ProblemⅡ(the controlling shareholder-minority shareholder conflict),which leads to relative passive cash dividend policy.