Network Externalities,Consumer Quality Preferences and the Choices of Technology Licensing
研究了存在网络外部性和消费者质量偏好差异时，在位企业如何选择最优技术许可策略，发现网络效应增强时最优策略从产出提成许可转向两部制许可，并从社会福利角度提出补贴和税收政策建议。
It established a multi-stage technology licensing game model with the aim to study the optimal choice of incumbent technology licensing in assumptions of product with network externalities and consumers with different quality preferences. The findings show that: firstly,the critical network intensity determining the optimal licensing strategy is increasing with product quality difference; secondly,aiming for profit maximization of the incumbent,the optimal technology licensing strategy are from outputs royalty licensing to two part tariff licensing with the increase of network effect;thirdly,from the perspective of social welfare maximization,optimal licensing strategy should be the fixed-fee licensing;fourthly,to solve the above contradictions,it proposed the policies such as subsidies in pre-innovation,taxations in post-licensing for the governments,and the method of product quality improvement for licensee. However,it proved that taxation in post-licensing just transfer ownership of royalty return from the licensor to the government,but cannot increase consumer surplus and improve social welfare. Meanwhile,although subsidies in pre-innovation and product quality improvement can increase social welfare,but still cannot achieve the optimal state of social welfare.