Government Governance,Control Structure and Investment Decision
基于双重代理视角，研究地方政府治理和家族超额控制如何影响企业投资对市场信号的敏感度，发现好的政府治理能提升投资效率，而家族超额控制则降低这种敏感度并导致次优投资。
This paper examines the influence of local government governance and control structure over the investment of family firm based on a double - agent perspective.Taking the listed family firms in China in the years of 2002 -2008 for the study sample,the empirical test found that family excess control via private control benefits changes the incentives of insider in family firm to reduce their propensity to listen to the market.We further find there is a strong positive association between local government governance and investment - q sensitivity, suggesting the local government encourage accurate share prices,reduce government intervention,access to external finance,and efficient investment.Furthermore,the negative impact of family excess control on investment -q sensitivity is primarily driven by sub - optimal investments.Overall,we provide the evidence that double - agent problem is an important factor that determines the learning from the stock market in capital allocation.