Benefits of partial myopia in a durable product supply chain considering pricing and advertising
研究耐用品供应链中制造商和零售商部分短视（只关注商誉动态、忽略销售演变）时的定价与广告策略，发现分散决策下部分短视能带来更高利润，而集中决策下相反。
Abstract Consider a bilateral monopoly supply chain where a manufacturer distributes a durable product through a retailer to end consumers. This paper develops a differential game in which the manufacturer determines the advertising and the wholesale price while the retailer sets the retail price. Channel members are partially myopic when they only consider goodwill dynamics and disregard sales evolution. We derive and compare partially myopic and forward-looking strategies with the following observations: First, under decentralized scenario, partially myopic channel members get higher profits than the forward-looking ones, while the opposite result occurs in centralized scenario. Second, when channel members are partially myopic, the distribution channel can benefit from the strategic decentralization.