The Effect of Public Service Motivation and Job Level on Bureaucrats’ Preferences for Direct Policy Instruments
基于韩国调查数据，研究发现公共服务动机越高的官僚越偏好直接政策工具，这种偏好尤其体现在低职位层级和更愿自我牺牲的官僚中，但并非出于自利动机。
Despite growing reliance on indirect market-based policy instruments under the New Public Management reforms, bureaucrats often prefer direct regulatory instruments. Thus, for successful implementation of indirect policy instruments, it is important to understand the underlying motives for bureaucrats’ preferences. This article shows that based on unique survey data from Korea, bureaucrats with higher public service motivation have a stronger preference for direct policy instruments. This pattern is strong for bureaucrats at lower job levels and for those who report greater willingness for self-sacrifice, but not necessarily for those who show strong commitment for the public interest. These results contradict a view that bureaucrats prefer direct policy instruments out of self-interest to maintain private benefits. Rather, direct policy instruments may require more work and even more unpleasant direct interactions with the clientele being served, but allow the bureaucrats to stay in control of and feel more responsible for the services provided.