Business Organisations, Party Systems and Tax Composition in Developing Countries: A Comparison between Colombia and Peru
研究了商业组织和政党制度如何影响发展中国家税收结构，通过比较1970-2010年秘鲁和哥伦比亚的税收历史，发现强大的商业组织和稳定的政党制度能降低经济精英对财政合同的不确定性，从而使其接受更高税负，政府则更多采用累进税制。
This paper explores the relationship between socio-political institutions and tax composition in developing countries. It argues that strong business organisations and stable political party systems reduce the uncertainty of fiscal contracts for economic elites. The decrease in uncertainty leads elites to accept a larger share of the tax burden, which governments then collect using progressive tax types more intensively. To illustrate this claim, I provide evidence from a comparative analysis of the Peruvian and the Colombian tax history between 1970 and 2010.