Do non-monetary prices target the poor? Evidence from a field experiment in India
利用印度实地实验中的支付意愿数据，研究货币价格和非货币价格（时间成本）如何影响健康产品对穷人的覆盖和瞄准效果，发现货币价格筛选出富人，而非货币价格对收入的选择性不强。
This paper uses willingness to pay data from a field experiment in India to study targeting health products to the poor, using monetary prices and non-monetary prices (time costs). I model demand for the product at monetary and non-monetary prices. The model illustrates that monetary prices screen out the poor and that whether non-monetary prices screen out the non-poor is theoretically ambiguous because of opposing income and substitution effects. I find monetary prices select richer households and non-monetary prices do not provide strong selection on income. Both the poor and non-poor appear very elastic in the non-monetary price because of the high value of time in home production. I evaluate the problem of a principal with a fixed budget whose objective places some weight on coverage and some weight on targeting. Despite better targeting with non-monetary prices, the principal optimally chooses a monetary price for a large range of parameters.