The Role of Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance in Securities Fraud Class Action Settlements
利用美国董事与高管责任保险数据，研究发现保险覆盖对和解金额的影响小于估计损失和案件质量，仅在质量最差的案件中保险才与和解相关，表明多数证券欺诈集体诉讼和解具有实质依据。
Because of previous data unavailability, it is unclear how important directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance is in securities fraud class action settlements. Using a unique data set of US D&O policies, we find that D&O insurance coverage is a less significant determinant of settlement amounts than estimated damages and proxies for the merits of cases. Limits on D&O insurance are related to settlements in only the weakest cases (those without allegations of accounting violations or institutional lead plaintiffs) where proxies for cases’ merits play a minimal role. Our findings suggest that most securities fraud class action settlements are meritorious and that accounting-related cases are a reasonable proxy for fraud.