Political Budget Cycles with Informed Voters: Evidence from Italy
利用意大利要求市政选举前披露资产负债表的改革，发现改革使选举前投资增长降低三分之一，且报纸读者多的地区效果加倍，表明知情选民能抑制预算操纵。
I exploit a reform that required Italian municipalities to disclose their balance sheets before elections to study whether having more informed voters affects the political budget cycle. Municipal investment in the year before elections is 28.5% higher than in electoral years, and the reform reduced this pre‐electoral spending increase by one third. I then study the role of local newspapers in disseminating municipal financial information to voters and find that the effect of the reform is twice as large in areas with relatively many newspaper readers, suggesting that mayors react to more informed voters by reducing spending manipulation.