Bundling strategy in base-supplemental goods markets: the case of Microsoft
研究了基础商品垄断者同时提供补充商品时，在零边际成本下捆绑销售是最优定价策略，并分析了其对社会福利和竞争对手利润的影响，适用于计算机软件市场如微软案例。
We show that bundling is the optimal pricing strategy for a base good monopolist who also supplies a supplemental good under zero marginal cost of product. Without the exit of the rival firm, bundling is a profitable strategy because it increases the profits in the base good market. We show that bundling lowers social welfare as well as rival firms' profit if the supplemental goods are close substitutes. Otherwise, bundling may actually generate welfare enhancements. Our analysis applies directly to the computer software markets and the case of Microsoft.