More for less? Puzzling selection effects in the insurance market
研究发现2012-13年英国车险市场存在反常现象：第三方责任险保费高于综合险，高免赔额保单保费反而更高，表明消费者信息不足且保险公司未实施激励相容约束。
We document a large and persistent anomaly in the UK car insurance market over the period 2012–13: insurance companies charged a higher premium for third-party (liability) insurance than comprehensive insurance (which includes third party). Furthermore, some companies charged higher premiums for comprehensive policies with larger deductibles. In contrast to current theories of adverse or propitious selection, our evidence suggests both that consumers are too confused or too poorly informed to arbitrage between policy types and that sellers of car insurance do not implement the incentive-compatibility constraints at the heart of consumer demand theory. This particular insurance market is much less sophisticated than that characterized by modern microeconomic theory.