Making it personal: breach and private ordering in a contract farming experiment
通过实验室实验研究无第三方强制执行的合同农业博弈，发现关系契约能减少违约，但直接沟通无额外效果，多数人不愿牺牲短期利益。
In a laboratory experiment, we study behaviour in a contract farming game without third-party enforcement but with an external spot market as outside option. We examine if and how relational contracts and personal communication support private-order enforcement. We find mixed evidence for our private ordering hypothesis. While relational contracting significantly reduces contract breach in general, the possibility for ‘direct bargaining communication’ has no additional positive effect. Both parties benefit from a well-functioning relation in the long run, yet most subjects are not willing to sacrifice short-term gains. If reputational mechanisms are absent, premiums are offered (but not paid).