Founding Family Control and Capital Structure: The Risk of Loss of Control and the Aversion to Debt
研究发现创始家族控制的企业更厌恶控制权丧失风险，因此使用更少的债务，且其债务选择对控制风险条件更敏感，而非家族企业的管理层持股与杠杆率无显著关系。
This paper tests the hypothesis that Founding Family Controlled Firms (FFCFs) are more averse to control risk than similar non-FFCFs and therefore avoid debt. Higher levels of debt increase the likelihood of bankruptcy and the level of control risk. We show that FFCFs use less debt; their choice of debt is more sensitive to conditions associated with control risk; and that leverage is not significantly related to managerial ownership in non-FFCFs, indicating that founding family control, not managerial ownership, matters in determining leverage.