Social Comparisons and Optimal Taxation in a Small Open Economy
研究了国际资本流动如何影响小国开放经济中的最优劳动和资本所得税政策，发现政府能否对海外储蓄征税是关键，若不能则资本所得税无效，劳动所得税需承担矫正功能。
Abstract In this paper, we analyze how international capital mobility affects the optimal labor and capital income tax policy in a small open economy when consumers care about relative consumption. The main results crucially depend on whether the government can tax returns on savings abroad. If the government can use flexible residence‐based capital income taxes, then the optimal policy rules from a closed economy largely carry over to the case of a small open economy. If it cannot, then capital income taxes become completely ineffective. The labor income taxes must then indirectly also reflect the corrective purpose that the absent capital income tax would have had.