Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
给出了一个简单充分条件，用于在固定贴现因子下，对两个玩家的不完全私人监测重复博弈中的序贯均衡收益集（帕累托前沿）进行递归上界界定。该边界集是完美监测且有中介的序贯均衡收益集，并具有简单的递归刻画。
We provide a simple sufficient condition for the existence of a recursive upper bound on (the Pareto frontier of) the sequential equilibrium payoff set at a fixed discount factor in two-player repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. The bounding set is the sequential equilibrium payoff set with perfect monitoring and a mediator. We show that this bounding set admits a simple recursive characterization, which nonetheless necessarily involves the use of private strategies. Under our condition, this set describes precisely those payoff vectors that arise in equilibrium for some private monitoring structure if either nonstationary monitoring or communication is allowed.