Are Politically Connected Firms More Likely to Evade Taxes? Evidence from Tunisia
利用突尼斯前总统本·阿里及其家族拥有的企业数据，研究发现政治关联企业更可能逃税，具体表现为不提交纳税申报或申报异常低的销售额。
Are politically connected firms more \n likely to evade taxes? Using tax, social security, and \n customs records from Tunisia in which firms owned by former \n president Ben Ali and his family are identified, this paper \n demonstrates that connected firms were more likely to evade \n taxes. Ceteris paribus, connected firms are 4.6 percent more \n likely not to submit a tax declaration in spite of \n registering workers and/or customs transactions and 8.4 \n percent more likely to report anomalously low sales when \n submitting a tax declaration.