Inflation Targeting, Recursive Inattentiveness, and Heterogeneous Beliefs
研究了央行设定通胀目标时，由于信息不完全导致公众对目标产生偏差认知，通过递归选择预测策略的模型，发现理性预期下的确定性条件不足以实现目标，需微调货币政策纠正偏差信念。
Abstract We consider a monetary authority that provides an explicit inflation target in order to align expectations with the policy objective. However, biased perceptions of the target may arise due to imperfect information flows. We allow agents to revise expectations over time and we model their recursive choice among prediction strategies as an optimization problem under rational inattention. We then investigate whether a simple policy rule can steer the economy toward the targeted equilibrium. Our findings suggest that determinacy under rational expectations may not be sufficient to reach the target. Instead, monetary policy should be fine‐tuned to correct agents' biased beliefs.