Bargaining over Entry with a Compulsory License Deadline: Price Spillovers and Surplus Expansion
研究发展中国家与跨国公司就专利产品本地价格进行谈判，分析强制许可威胁如何影响进入时机和剩余分配，对理解知识产权政策与市场进入策略有参考价值。
We analyze bargaining between a developing country (South) and a multinational firm over the local price of its patented product. We use an alternating offers bargaining game in which the South can resort to compulsory licensing (CL) if the two parties fail to reach agreement by a certain deadline. The presence of international price spillovers introduces two novel features into the standard bargaining problem: the surplus from entry prior to the CL deadline may be negative, and CL can yield higher surplus than entry. We establish conditions under which equilibrium may exhibit immediate entry, preemptive entry just prior to the CL deadline, or the occurrence of CL. The South necessarily gains from the threat of CL if the joint payoff under entry is higher relative to CL but can lose if it is lower.