Collusion Under Risk Aversion and Fixed Costs
研究了风险厌恶的卡特尔在需求不确定下如何合谋，发现当风险厌恶足够强且固定成本较高时，合谋限制产出的难度在低需求和高需求时都较大，产出相对垄断水平呈U形函数。
We analyze collusion under demand uncertainty by risk‐averse cartels that care about the utility derived from profits. With sufficient risk aversion and non‐trivial fixed operating costs, it becomes difficult for cartels to collusively restrict output both when demand is low and marginal dollars are highly valued, and when demand is high and potential defection profits are high: output relative to monopoly levels becomes a U‐shaped function of demand. Greater risk aversion or higher fixed operating costs make collusion more difficult to support in recessions, but easier to support in booms.