Magical thinking: A representation result
提出一种将个体选择公理理论引入策略环境的新方法，以囚徒困境为例，建立包含神奇思维的行为模型，该模型能统一解释多种经典博弈中的行为并产生新预测。
This paper suggests a novel way to import the approach of axiomatic theories of individual choice into strategic settings and demonstrates the benefits of this approach. We propose both a tractable behavioral model as well as axioms applied to the behavior of the collection of players, focusing first on prisoners' dilemma games. A representation theorem establishes these axioms as the precise behavioral content of the model, and that the model's parameters are (essentially) uniquely identified from behavior. The behavioral model features magical thinking: players behave as if their expectations about their opponents' behavior vary with their own choices. The model provides a unified view of documented behavior in a range of often studied games, such as the prisoners' dilemma, the battle of the sexes, hawk-dove, and the stag hunt, and also generates novel predictions across games.