Board Monitoring in a Privately Held Firm: When Does CEO Duality Matter? The Moderating Effect of Ownership
基于代理理论和注意力基础观，研究发现在私营企业中CEO二元性仅对行为控制任务有显著负向影响，且这种影响取决于控股股东的存在及其类型。
Drawing from agency theory and the attention-based view of the firm, this study extends the understanding of the conditions under which CEO duality is negatively associated with board monitoring in a privately held firm context. Measuring monitoring in terms of board members’ involvement in behavioral control, output control, and strategy control tasks (Huse 2005), results show that CEO duality is significantly and negatively related only to the behavioral control task. In addition, we show that this negative effect is contingent on whether ownership is concentrated in the hands of a controlling shareholder as well as the type of controlling shareholder.