Collusion and heterogeneity of firms
研究了在动态伯特兰竞争中，企业贴现率异质性如何影响合谋的可持续性与效率，发现合谋可能当且仅当平均贴现因子超过某阈值，且长期中耐心与不耐心企业将主导市场。
We examine the impact of heterogeneous discounting on collusion in dynamic Bertrand competition. We show exactly when collusion can be sustained and how collusion would be organized efficiently with heterogeneous discounting. First, we show that collusion is possible if and only if the average discount factor exceeds a certain threshold, with or without capacity constraints. Next, we identify a dynamic pattern of market share that characterizes efficient collusion and obtain the unique long‐run prediction despite the presence of multiple equilibria. In the long run, the most patient firm and the most impatient firm tend to dominate the market.