Equilibrium Coordination With Discretionary Policy Making
研究了相机决策者无法管理私人部门预期和协调未来政策制定者行动时，如何通过自我执行性和可学习性标准识别多重均衡中的特定均衡，发现除非帕累托最优均衡能被私人部门学习，否则难以协调到该均衡。
Discretionary policy makers cannot manage private‐sector expectations and cannot coordinate the actions of future policy makers. As a consequence, coordination failures can occur and multiple equilibria can arise. In this article, we employ notions of self‐enforceability and learnability to motivate and identify equilibria of particular interest in discretionary policy problems exhibiting multiple equilibria. Central among these criteria are whether an equilibrium is robust to the formation of coalitions, and whether it is learnable by private agents and jointly learnable by private agents and the policy maker. Unless the Pareto‐preferred equilibrium is learnable by private agents, we find little reason to expect coordination on that equilibrium.