Direct and Cross Effects of Employment Protection: The Case of Parental Childcare
研究就业保护改革如何影响在职父母的育儿行为，发现解雇更容易时，父亲直接减少育儿假使用，且配偶也因解雇风险增加而减少育儿假，表明配偶劳动供给可对冲收入风险。
Abstract I examine whether employment protection affects the willingness of working parents to provide childcare. Using a reform that made it easier for employers to dismiss workers in small firms, I find that softer employment protection reduces the use of temporary parental leave among directly treated fathers. In addition, I find that households respond to an increase in the dismissal risk by reducing temporary parental leave for the indirectly treated spouse. Spousal labor supply can thus serve as informal insurance against adverse income shocks.