Endogenous Entry to Security-Bid Auctions
研究了在安全投标拍卖中，竞拍者需承担参与成本并根据私人估值决定是否进入，发现更陡峭的证券不仅提高卖家收入，还吸引更多竞拍者进入，进一步增加收入。
We endogenize entry to a security-bid auction, where participation is costly and bidders must decide given their private valuations whether to participate. We first consider any minimum reserve security-bid of a fixed expected value that weakly exceeds the asset's value when retained by the seller. DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2005) establish that with a fixed number of bidders, auctions with steeper securities yield the seller more revenues. Counterintuitively, we find that auctions with steeper securities also attract more entry, further enhancing the revenues from such auctions. We then establish that with optimal reserve securities, auctions with steeper securities always yield higher expected revenues.