Truthtelling in Matching Markets
研究了非转移效用和不对称信息下的搜索匹配模型，分析廉价谈话沟通能否传递信息及其对福利的影响，发现沟通仅在无沟通时匹配为选型匹配且信息传递不改变匹配时才能帕累托改进。
Abstract We analyze a search and matching model with non‐transferable utility and asymmetric information. Randomly paired agents go through an evaluation phase, at the end of which they discover each other's types and choose to match or not. Before deciding to enter this phase, agents can communicate through cheap talk. We provide conditions for this communication to be informative, and we examine how it affects agents' welfare. We show that communication is Pareto‐improving only when the matching is assortative in the absence of communication and left unchanged by information transmission.