Pro‐Consumer Price Ceilings under Regulatory Uncertainty*
研究了当监管者不确定需求且追求消费者剩余最大化时，如何设定最优价格上限。发现不确定性足够大时，应设置相对较高的价格上限；在不完全竞争下，竞争越激烈，上限越宽松。
Abstract We examine optimal price ceilings when the regulator is uncertain about demand and maximizes expected consumer surplus. With perfect competition, if regulatory uncertainty is large enough, then softer intervention is called for, with the price ceiling set at a relatively high level compared with a full information scenario. In an imperfectly competitive setting where symmetric firms compete in supply functions, with large enough uncertainty, the optimal ceiling increases with the degree of competition, so greater competitive pressure justifies less restrictive regulation. Under perfect competition, we also determine a cut‐off level of rationing efficiency below which a price ceiling should not be used.