Occupational Segregation and the (Mis)allocation of Talent
研究了竞争性劳动力市场中职业隔离如何影响人才配置，通过模型分析发现网络外部性和金钱外部性导致均衡与有效配置偏离，其主导效应取决于工资对职业隔离程度的弹性。
Abstract In this paper, I study how occupational segregation affects the allocation of talent in a competitive labour market. I propose a model of occupational choice in which heterogeneous workers must rely on their social contacts to acquire job‐vacancy information. While occupational segregation implies benefits in terms of job‐finding probability, it also leads to allocative inefficiencies. Efficient and equilibrium outcomes differ due to a network externality that leads workers to segregate too little, and a pecuniary externality that leads workers to segregate too much. Which effect dominates depends on the elasticity of wages to changes in the degree of occupational segregation.