Observing and Shaping the Market: The Dilemma of Central Banks
分析了央行在观察市场的同时通过货币政策塑造市场，导致信息内生性困境，进而影响最优政策选择，对研究货币政策传导和央行沟通的学者有参考价值。
Abstract While the central bank observes market activity to assess economic fundamentals, it shapes the market outcome through the conduct of monetary policy. A dilemma arises from this dual role because the more the central bank shapes the market, the more it influences the informational content of market outcomes. This paper analyzes how accounting for the endogeneity of information affects optimal monetary policy. By reducing the accuracy of central bank information, endogenous information calls for a higher degree of opacity, weakens accommodation policy to shocks, and broadens the range of parameters for which taking a signaling action is detrimental to welfare.