Law Enforcement in a Federal System: On the Strategic Choice of Sanction Levels
研究了联邦体系中不同层级政府执法决策的相互影响，发现地方执法会因犯罪转移产生过度激励，而中央可通过调整制裁水平来缓解这一问题，非最大制裁可能更优。
This paper explores law enforcement in a federal system to address the reality that the level of deterrence often results from decision making at different levels of the system. In this setting, the presence of interregional externalities in the form of crime diversion induces socially excessive law enforcement incentives at the local level. We show that the adverse repercussions of uncoordinated enforcement decisions at the local level may be ameliorated by the strategic choice of the sanction at the central level. A nonmaximal sanction may be optimal, even though a maximal sanction would be optimal when the central level chooses all law enforcement variables. This conclusion shows that optimal law enforcement in a federal system must take account of the strategic interdependencies of relevant actors. We also discuss whether other arrangements of decision-making powers may be associated with higher levels of welfare.