ANTIDUMPING ECHOING
发现不同国家会先后对同一出口国的同一产品实施反倾销措施（即“回声”现象），通过动态博弈模型和计量分析证明，这种相互依赖的反倾销行为由各国的政治经济因素驱动。
This article documents that antidumping ( AD ) “echoing” (i.e., different countries sequentially imposing AD measures on the same product from the same exporter) is common practice among users of AD . We develop a dynamic game where two competing importers can impose AD measures on a third exporting country in one of two periods, if at all. Assuming that governments are politically motivated (favoring their import‐competing industry), AD echoing occurs only for intermediate values of a country's political‐economy parameter. This result is confirmed by our econometric analysis, demonstrating that countries' political‐economy‐driven AD actions are interdependent and should not be analyzed in isolation.