Coordination and performance analysis for a three-echelon supply chain with a revenue sharing contract
研究了一个由制造商、分销商和零售商组成的三级供应链，分析了收益共享合同在同时行动博弈和领导者-追随者博弈下的协调效果，发现除特殊情况外无法协调后者，但可衡量绩效改进潜力。
This paper focuses on a three-echelon supply chain composed of a manufacturer, a distributor and a retailer for a single selling period. Based on a revenue sharing contract, the coordination of the decentralised supply chain with the simultaneous move game or the leader–follower game is analysed. It is determined that the revenue sharing contract can coordinate the decentralised supply chain with the simultaneous move game. Our analysis reveals that the revenue sharing contract cannot coordinate the decentralised three-echelon supply chain with the leader–follower game except for a special situation. However, this result provides an opportunity to develop methodology and results that measure the potential improvement in supply chain performance that can be gained from utilising the revenue sharing contract. This is an important aspect of this paper.