A newsvendor problem with boundedly rational strategic customers
研究了有限理性策略顾客在销售季购买或等待折扣的报童问题，分析了报童定价和订货决策，发现有限理性参数大时均衡唯一，否则多重均衡存在。
This work considers a newsvendor system with strategic customers who are boundedly rational in terms of buying during the selling season or waiting for a discount in the savage market. The newsvendor’s decisions are to determine the selling price and order quantity. An optimisation problem is formulated with the incorporation of a game for interaction between strategic customers. We use the quantal choice framework to characterise the behaviour of strategic customers. It is shown that when the bounded rationality parameter is large, the quantal response equilibrium is unique; otherwise, multiple equilibria may exist. For the unique equilibrium case, it is not difficult to determine the optimal decisions for the newsvendor. For the multiple equilibria case, we give theoretical analyses and numerical calculations to provide implications to the newsvendor. Additionally, based on the special case (with perfectly rational strategic customers), some important results are also observed.