ENDOGENOUS PRESIDENTIALISM
构建模型解释总统制与议会制的选择，指出总统制虽有三权分立但未必制衡更强，政治领袖偏好总统制可能源于担心失去议程设置权，模型与非洲和拉丁美洲的定性证据一致。
We develop a model to understand the incidence of presidential and parliamentary institutions. Our analysis is predicated on two ideas: first, that minorities are relatively powerful in a parliamentary system compared to a presidential system, and second, that presidents have more power with respect to their own coalition than prime ministers do. These assumptions imply that while presidentialism has separation of powers, it does not necessarily have more checks and balances than parliamentarism. We show that political leaders who prefer presidentialism may be supported by their own coalition if they fear losing agenda-setting power to another group. We argue that the model is consistent with a great deal of qualitative information about presidentialism in Africa and Latin America.