Do We Really Need to Change the Decision Maker? Counterintuitive Escalation of Commitment Results in Real Options Contexts
研究发现，在实物期权情境中，让同一决策者参与两阶段决策反而会减少承诺升级行为，这与传统认知相反，表明更换决策者并非必要。
A robust finding in the escalation literature, termed as the preference effect, is that involvement in the period 1 initial project assessment decision increases the tendency for decision makers to stick with a losing course of action during the period 2 project reassessment decision. The proposed solution is to bring in a new decision maker in period 2. Across multiple studies, we show that providing period 1 information in real options format increases the tendency for decision makers to view period 2 focal event information as both more negative and more important. Consequently, such decision makers exhibit less escalation in period 2, i.e., exhibit behavior opposite to the preference effect. This suggests that, in real option contexts, not only do we not need to bring in a new decision maker, but also (counterintuitively) it is beneficial to retain the same decision maker in situations where escalation is likely to occur. This paper was accepted by Yuval Rottenstreich, judgment and decision making.