Consistency as a Signal of Skills
通过两期模型和主被试实验，研究一致性如何作为技能的信号，发现一致性确实与技能相关，因此人们会为了被他人看重而表现出一致行为。
This paper studies the role of consistency as a signaling device. We propose a two-period model that highlights the informativeness of consistency as a signal of skills and allows for the analysis of consequences for behavior. In a simple principal–agent experiment, we test the basic intuition of the model. We show that consistency is indeed associated with skills. Consequently, consistency is valued by others, inducing people to act consistently. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2459 . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.