Discounts as a Barrier to Entry
研究在位制造商能否通过折扣合同阻止高效进入者，发现不承诺无条件转移的返利（如欧盟委员会诉米其林II案中的返利）即使在成本不确定、规模经济或下游激烈竞争下也不具有反竞争性，与排他性交易合同不同。
To what extent can an incumbent manufacturer use discount contracts to foreclose efficient entry? We show that off-list-price rebates that do not commit buyers to unconditional transfers—like the rebates in EU Commission v. Michelin II, for instance—cannot be anticompetitive. This is true even in the presence of cost uncertainty, scale economies, or intense downstream competition, all three market settings where exclusion has been shown to emerge with exclusive dealing contracts. The difference stems from the fact that, unlike exclusive dealing provisions, rebates do not contractually commit retailers to exclusivity when signing the contract.