Which Budgetary Union for the E(M)U?
本文探讨在欧洲经济货币联盟内建立预算联盟是否可行且合适，以解决欧元危机造成的僵局，并指出不完全预算联盟（如设立特定保险机制）是更现实的选择。
Abstract This article considers whether the creation of a budgetary union in the European EMU (economic and monetary union) is a feasible and suitable way to resolve the current impasse created by the euro crisis. The article begins by identifying the major drawbacks concerning the transposition of prescriptions regarding fiscal federalism to the current E(M)U scenario, with the outlook that this appears to be an extemporaneous solution. It then indicates the alternative conception of an incomplete budgetary union, which is mostly characterized by the setting up of specific insurance mechanisms. These alternative measures are shown to be more realistic and feasible, since they combine path dependency with an innovative appropriation of specific features of the classic federalism model, modifying them to an E(M)U scenario in a heterodox way.