Managerial Family Ties and Employee Risk Bearing in Family Firms: Evidence from Spanish Car Dealers
研究西班牙219家家族汽车经销商发现，非家族高管主导的管理团队更倾向通过激励薪酬将风险转嫁给员工，企业规模越大这一倾向越明显，但销售下滑时两类管理团队的差异会缩小。
This article argues that family firms in which the top management team (TMT) is dominated by nonfamily managers are more likely to shift risk to employees through incentive pay schemes than family firms with TMTs dominated by family members. We also argue that this tendency is aggravated in firms of bigger size, as this condition makes nonfamily managers more vulnerable. We further note that differences between family‐ and non‐family‐dominated TMTs may lessen when the sales trend is negative. The analyses conducted on a sample of 219 family‐controlled car dealerships in Spain confirm our expectations.