Olson’s exploitation hypothesis in a public good economy: a reconsideration
针对奥尔森剥削假说（富人承担公共品供给负担）存在的经验反例，提出基于贡献者偏好差异或生产率差异的两种替代假说，并用国际公共品案例说明。
Since the publication of Olson’s (1965) The Logic of Collective Action, the exploitation hypothesis, in which the rich shoulder the provision burden of public goods for the poor, has held sway despite empirical exceptions. To address such exceptions, we establish two alternative exploitation hypotheses based on contributors’ asymmetric preferences or on their productivity differences regarding the public good. The classic hypothesis and its two variants are proven in a novel fashion. For asymmetric preferences, we also establish the exploitation hypothesis for the joint products model with private and public co-benefits. Our theoretical insights are then illustrated by some empirical examples from the field of international public goods, such as military defense and cross-border pollution.