Incentives in experiments with objective lotteries
研究当被试视概率为客观时（如使用骰子或硬币），激励相容支付机制的范围是否扩大，发现虽有所扩大但新增机制适用性有限，唯一广泛适用的仍是随机选取一次决策支付。
Abstract Azrieli et al. (J Polit Econ, 2018) provide a characterization of incentive compatible payment mechanisms for experiments, assuming subjects’ preferences respect dominance but can have any possible subjective beliefs over random outcomes. If instead we assume subjects view probabilities as objective—for example, when dice or coins are used—then the set of incentive compatible mechanisms may grow. In this paper we show that it does, but the added mechanisms are not widely applicable. As in the subjective-beliefs framework, the only broadly-applicable incentive compatible mechanism (assuming all preferences that respect dominance are admissible) is to pay subjects for one randomly-selected decision.