The Effect of Relative Encoding on Memory-Based Judgments
研究发现，人们在做基于记忆的判断时，依赖的是最初编码时选项在分布中的相对位置，而非绝对质量或后来更新的排序。
Several models of judgment propose that people struggle with absolute judgments and instead represent options on the basis of their relative standing. This leads to a conundrum when people make judgments from memory: They may encode an option's ordinal rank relative to the surrounding options but later observe a different distribution of options. Do people update their representations when making judgments from memory, or do they maintain their representations based on the initial encoding? In three studies, we found that people making memory-based judgments rely on a stimulus's relative standing in the distribution at the time of encoding rather than attending to absolute quality or updating the stimulus's ordinal ranking in light of the distribution at the time of the later judgment.