ZONING A CROSS‐BORDER CITY
研究两个相邻城镇的监管者如何利用区划策略影响企业选址，发现监管者可能为争夺消费者而将企业限制在边界附近，且当区划有成本时可能只有一方采用此策略。
ABSTRACT This paper investigates zoning in a cross‐border linear city that consists of two bordering towns. In each town, a local regulator has a say in the location of the local firm. We find that local regulators may use zoning strategically. The incentive to gain consumers from the other town, or not to lose local consumers, may push regulators to approve only locations for firms close enough to the frontier. When zoning is costly an asymmetric equilibrium may emerge: only one regulator resorts to zoning. In the case of towns of different sizes, the regulator of the larger town is the only one that zones in an asymmetric equilibrium.