Resale price maintenance and manufacturer competition for retail services
研究两个制造商通过共同零售商使用最低转售价格维持（RPM）的动机，发现RPM提高消费者价格、可能造成制造商囚徒困境，且不增加甚至减少零售服务总量，挑战了服务作为RPM效率辩护的观点。
We investigate the incentives of two manufacturers with common retailers to use resale price maintenance (RPM). Retailers provide product‐specific services that increase demand and manufacturers use minimum RPM to compete for favorable retail services for their products. Minimum RPM increases consumer prices and can create a prisoner's dilemma for manufacturers without increasing, and possibly even reducing, the overall level of retail services. If manufacturer market power is asymmetric, minimum RPM may distort the allocation of services toward the high‐priced products of the manufacturer with more market power. These results challenge the service argument as an efficiency defense for minimum RPM.